On January 25, President Trump signed two executive orders laying out new rules to treat unauthorized immigrants on the US-Mexico border and within the US. On Monday, Homeland Security issued memos on how to implement them.
This is all very much consistent with Trump’s campaign promises regarding immigration and Mexico. Having said that, from Mexico’s point of view there are some things to consider, particularly given that Homeland Security is planning to send people back “to the territory from which they came”, regardless of their nationality and without a resolution from immigration courts. This means that the US would be sending hundreds of thousands of migrants from Central and South America, and even from Haiti, Cuba, and Africa, back to Mexico.
Continue reading “Trump’s New Deportation Rules Will Have a Harsh Effect in Mexico”
It is still early in the administration of Donald Trump (has it really only been a month?) and fortunately there haven’t been any serious foreign policy crises yet. But that is not to say that all is well in the national security offices of the executive branch. Disturbing and dangerous signs are visible that President Trump has no idea what he is doing, makes up policy on the fly, likely based on whatever cable news show he last watched, and ignores his cabinet and policy advisers, forcing them to either contort policy around Trump’s tweets and outbursts or to clean up the mess from what he has unwittingly done. Meanwhile, Trump spends much of his time on the links and trying to hide his golf outings from the press.
This is an echo of the offer that was allegedly made to John Kasich during the campaign that if he became vice president he would be in charge of making policy and running the country while the president focused on “making America great again.” But it is, in fact, much much worse.
Everything that the president says matters. His words are parsed and scrutinized by everyone from friends to allies to enemies. When the president does not, will not, and cannot lead effectively and efficiently it causes chaos and uncertainty, neither of which are desirable in foreign policy. While surprise is good on the battlefield, it is bad in geopolitics, where wars can erupt over misunderstandings and where delicate policy negotiations can be undone by one errant remark. Trump’s “un-leadership” is endangering not just US national security but the peace and stability that the international system has long enjoyed.
Continue reading “Dangers of Un-Leadership”
The bottom line is that, when a vacuum opens up, someone wants to fill it. And when there are multiple people with competing interests trying to fill it, there will be a power struggle.
I had barely posted my note about Flynn’s NSC and the Trump administration’s potential problems with pushing through arms sales to the Saudis when the word came in that Flynn was resigning. Several people have asked what the implications of this might be, so here are my initial thoughts.
This is certain to make an already unsettled NSC staff even more unsettled. Flynn, regardless of what anyone thinks of him, was the one who was providing direction and guidance to the NSC staff. With him gone, uncertainty about policy, the status of initiatives that are already underway, and frankly the safety of people’s jobs will skyrocket. Although Kellogg, the acting NSA, is reportedly under consideration to take on the job officially, he is a Flynn hire, and may not be asked to stay (see below on power struggles). A significant number of staffers were brought in by Flynn on the strength of personal connections, and if a new NSA is brought in (we’re hearing that the front-runner is retired Vice Admiral Robert Harward, and the third name under consideration is David Petraeus), he will want to bring in his own people. Again, it is hardly unusual for there to be a lot of personnel turnover during an administration transition, but this is an unusual and unnecessary level of turmoil, and the whole world can see it.
The fact that Flynn was clearly a close advisor to Trump indicates that there will be a power vacuum, and there will be several people looking to take advantage of that: Continue reading “Flynn Fallout”
In the Sunday edition of the New York Times, there was a story in which it was alleged that the National Security Council Staff was in much more disarray than is normal even for a new administration.
I want to focus on just one point in that NYT story, though, because it’s a point that may have escaped a lot of readers:
“Two people with direct access to the White House leadership said Mr. Flynn was surprised to learn that the State Department and Congress play a pivotal role in foreign arms sales and technology transfers. So it was a rude discovery that Mr. Trump could not simply order the Pentagon to send more weapons to Saudi Arabia.”
Continue reading “How To Sell Weapons to Saudi Arabia (Hint: you have to let Congress know)”
A few thoughts on yesterday’s decision from the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in State of Washington v Trump:
- Just so everyone is clear (I’ve seen some mischaracterizations of what happened), the court did not strike down the executive order suspending immigration from seven Muslim countries for 90 days and refugees for 120 days and barring all refugees from Syria indefinitely. Rather, the court declined to lift the suspension imposed by federal judge James Robart.
- The court did not find that the administration does not have the power to suspend visas to countries deemed by the president to present significant national security threats.
- The court did find that states can get standing to sue over immigration restrictions. Standing–the right to claim injury in order to be allowed to bring suit–is notoriously difficult to “get” in national security cases.However, the court found that:
the States have alleged harms to their proprietary interests traceable to the Executive Order. The necessary connection can be drawn in at most two logical steps: (1) the Executive Order prevents nationals of seven countries from entering Washington and Minnesota; (2) as a result, some of these people will not enter state universities, some will not join those universities as faculty, some will be prevented from performing research, and some will not be permitted to return if they leave. And we have no difficulty concluding that the States’ injuries would be redressed if they could obtain the relief they ask for: a declaration that the Executive Order violates the Constitution and an injunction barring its enforcement.
Continue reading “A Few Thoughts on the 9th Circuit’s Decision”
Several people have, either in the comments on the original post or on Facebook, asked about the US’s response to the Iranian missile test on Sunday, January 29. On Friday, February 3, the Trump administration levied sanctions against 13 individuals and 12 companies associated with Iran’s missile program. This was followed by a war of words, with President Trump and National Security Adviser Flynn warning Iran about further tests and telling Iran that they had it easy under President Obama, while Iran called out Trump as an “inexperienced person.” The sanctions are rather limited, as they do not touch Iran’s $16 billion deal with Boeing and aren’t significantly more punishing that the sanctions regime already in place.
So, what did Iran likely learn from these events? Given that they conducted a series of missile tests on Saturday, February 4, the day after the imposition of the new sanctions, it’s likely that they learned–rightly or wrongly–that the Trump administration is lots of bluster but is ultimately nothing to fear. True, the most recent missile launches were conducted entirely within Iranian sovereign airspace, making them less problematic for the international community. But the test should still be seen as an act of defiance.
Continue reading “Update on Iran’s Missile Tests”