(Disclosure: while I worked in the Pentagon office that oversees these types of operations, I was there in 2013/14 and I have no special knowledge of this specific mission. I am going to talk in generalities. The views presented here are the author’s personal views and do not represent the position of the U.S. Naval War College, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.)
Over the last few days, I have seen several attempts to explain what U.S. troops are doing in Niger, and they range from Lindsay Graham’s assurance that the troops are there “to defend America” to claims that this was some sort of Trump-Russia secret mission (Maddow).
As usual, the truth is both more complicated and more boring. We have lots of small groups of U.S. military personnel all over the world, and all of them are there because U.S. administrations of both parties have, for decades, favored a foreign policy posture of forward defense. Some combination of people from the Combatant Command (in this case, AFRICOM), the country team, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the State Department, the National Security Council Staff, and Congress thought it was in the interests of the United States to have them there.
Reasonable, informed people can disagree on whether these missions are good policy, whether they are likely to work, or whether they carry an appropriate risk-to-reward ratio … but first it’s important to be informed. So, in this post, I will go over what types of missions the bulk of U.S. military personnel in Africa are doing, and then explain the basic policy logic underpinning our operations in Africa.
Continue reading “Why Are U.S. Troops in Niger?”
The bottom line is that, when a vacuum opens up, someone wants to fill it. And when there are multiple people with competing interests trying to fill it, there will be a power struggle.
I had barely posted my note about Flynn’s NSC and the Trump administration’s potential problems with pushing through arms sales to the Saudis when the word came in that Flynn was resigning. Several people have asked what the implications of this might be, so here are my initial thoughts.
This is certain to make an already unsettled NSC staff even more unsettled. Flynn, regardless of what anyone thinks of him, was the one who was providing direction and guidance to the NSC staff. With him gone, uncertainty about policy, the status of initiatives that are already underway, and frankly the safety of people’s jobs will skyrocket. Although Kellogg, the acting NSA, is reportedly under consideration to take on the job officially, he is a Flynn hire, and may not be asked to stay (see below on power struggles). A significant number of staffers were brought in by Flynn on the strength of personal connections, and if a new NSA is brought in (we’re hearing that the front-runner is retired Vice Admiral Robert Harward, and the third name under consideration is David Petraeus), he will want to bring in his own people. Again, it is hardly unusual for there to be a lot of personnel turnover during an administration transition, but this is an unusual and unnecessary level of turmoil, and the whole world can see it.
The fact that Flynn was clearly a close advisor to Trump indicates that there will be a power vacuum, and there will be several people looking to take advantage of that: Continue reading “Flynn Fallout”
In the Sunday edition of the New York Times, there was a story in which it was alleged that the National Security Council Staff was in much more disarray than is normal even for a new administration.
I want to focus on just one point in that NYT story, though, because it’s a point that may have escaped a lot of readers:
“Two people with direct access to the White House leadership said Mr. Flynn was surprised to learn that the State Department and Congress play a pivotal role in foreign arms sales and technology transfers. So it was a rude discovery that Mr. Trump could not simply order the Pentagon to send more weapons to Saudi Arabia.”
Continue reading “How To Sell Weapons to Saudi Arabia (Hint: you have to let Congress know)”
If we want to preserve the rules-based system, we must resist the grey zone divide-and-conquer tactics. We must work to form coalitions of people who may agree on nothing other than the fact that they still want to live under the rule of law.
I was going to write a post about how excessive restrictions on immigration are bad for the U.S. in terms of economics, foreign policy, moral leadership, and national/international security. However, plenty of other people beat me to it, and you can find economic cases here , here , and here ; Senators McCain and Graham here ; a bipartisan group of national security professionals here ; a bunch of Nobel Prize winners and other academics here ; more experts here and here ; the intelligence repercussions here , and countless others .
So, instead of that, I want to talk about one way I think we can understand the approach this administration appears to be taking, and what that means for how to respond to it. I’m going to argue that what this administration is doing looks an awful lot like what security people are now calling “grey zone conflict”. That matters for two reasons: first, it gives us a preview of some possible effects of this approach. Second, it gives us some idea of how to respond … and how not to respond.
“Grey zone conflict” is a term coined fairly recently to describe the behavior of Russia in Ukraine and Eastern Europe, and China in the South China Seas. It is an approach used by revisionists against the status quo, but specifically by revisionists who appear to be rising in power and/or “near-peer competitors” to the status quo power. It is an approach that can be used to achieve both short and long term goals, and it is particularly attractive to state actors who already own the presumption of legitimacy (as opposed to, e.g., insurgency, which is done by non-state actors who want to attack the status quo and create legitimacy for themselves). Grey zone conflict is generally defined by NOT meeting the generally accepted standards of armed conflict or terrorism. It frequently involves cyber attacks, information warfare, faits accomplis, and disruptions (sometimes violent) caused allegedly by private citizens (e.g., Russia’s “little green men” in Ukraine). Mike Mazarr describes it like this: “The central strategic concept of gray zone strategies is to confront their targets with a conundrum. Any one specific act in the chain will have limited stakes, but responding to it has the potential to escalate and create a crisis … Gradual gray zone tactics are thus designed to place their intended targets in a no-win position” (Mazarr, “Mastering the Gray Zone”). This is what Schelling called “salami slicing”: each individual action is insufficient to cause/justify a backlash, and as they come in piecemeal, there never seems to be a clear point at which the line has been crossed, but at some point, the line has clearly been left far behind, and the status quo actor is at a massive disadvantage.
Continue reading “Grey Zones”